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Abstract: We study the MPNE of a game between oil importing countries seeking to
maintain atmospheric carbon concentration under a given ceiling and exporting countries,
when the former sets a carbon tax and the latter controls the producer price. We obtain
implicit feedback rules and explicit non-linear time paths of extraction, carbon tax and
producer price. Consumers are always able to reap some part of the scarcity and monopoly
rents, whereas producers partially preempt the carbon tax only if the marginal damage
under the ceiling is small. We compare the MPNE to the e¢cient, open loop and cartel
without tax equilibria.
Keywords: global warming, non-renewable resources, di¤erential games, non-linear strate-
gies.
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I Introduction1
Three key lessons stand out from the Copenhagen Summit in December 2009. First, the
agreement recognizes the need for the temperature rise to stay below 2 degrees Celsius,
which is usually associated with a greenhouse gas concentration ceiling of 450 ppm (IPCC
(2007)). This shared objective is a signicant progress obtained in Copenhagen. The
two other lessons are less constructive: the inability of the largest emitting countries to
reach even a basic e¤ective agreement on an international policy architecture designed to
aim towards this common objective; and OPECs hostility to any international agreement
which would nally result in a sensible contraction of world oil demand. OPEC repeatedly
argues that climate policy is still another excuse to steal the oil rent to nance public
spending in oil importing countries, and even asks for compensation for the reduction of
its income.
That OPEC does not contemplate introducing a climate policy, and reacts negatively
when oil importing countries do, is not entirely surprising. As Wirl and Dockner (1995)
mentioned, an example of such strategic OPECs reaction is the oil price increase of $4
per barrel in the 1992s rst-half, matching the rst step of the EEC proposal of a hybrid
energy-carbon tax. The crude oil price increase allows OPEC to make climate policy to a
certain extent useless since it may be su¢cient to trigger the demand decrease desired by
consuming countries. By doing so, OPEC captures a part of what we can call the carbon
or climate rent.
However, oil consuming countries can also behave as a coalition and adopt a carbon
1The authors acknowledge the support of the French National Research Agency (ANR) under the
CLEANER project (ANR_NT09_505778). We are grateful to two anonymous referees for helpful sug-
gestions and comments.
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tax which allows them to reap some part of the oil rent2. A global climate agreement
of oil importing countries coordinating their carbon taxation could be interpreted as a
consumers cartel, would it happen to exist3. The implementation of a high carbon tax
could prompt OPEC to lower its producer price in order to limit the decrease of oil
demand.
Since the increases in oil price between 1998 and 2008, and especially the very strong
increase of summer 2008, many OECD countries have led the idea that the government
must control the consumer price of oil and that, to do so, taxes on energy should be
oating, or additional, to use two terms coined in France: they should decrease when
the producer price increases, and vice versa. This proposal is clearly a bad one, as OECD
(2006) points out, for strategic reasons: If oil importers start to reduce taxes in order to
stabilise tax-inclusive fuel prices, oil exporters will know that they can at no risk increase
their resource rents by restraining their production and thus increase crude prices further.
Normally such actions would trigger reductions in demand that could reduce the incomes
of the oil producers, but the demand reductions will be absent if tax-inclusive user prices
are kept stable by tax reductions.
What is the result of the previous two-sided strategic behaviour? Does the producers
cartel capture the climate rent or does the consumers cartel capture the scarcity and
monopoly rents? Is the time path of extraction more or less conservative than what would
2Besides objectives of public spending nancing and energy savings, the high levels of fuel taxes in
the European countries can be viewed also as an attempt to capture a part of the scarcity and monopoly
rents. On average, between one-third and one-half of the total price of unleaded gasoline is excise tax.
3Some oil consuming countries have already implemented carbon taxes: Finland, Denmark, Norway
and Sweden since 1991, Switzerland in 2008, but these policies remain isolated. Cap and trade schemes
have the same consequences but even the largest existing system, the EU-ETS, cannot be interpreted as
a global agreement on climate policy.
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be optimal? What are the consequences of strategic climate policy in terms of welfare
and in terms of distribution among the two coalitions? These are the main questions we
address in this paper.
They have to some extent already been addressed from a theoretical point of view by
Wirl (1994), (1995), Tahvonen (1995), (1996), Rubio and Escriche (2001) and Liski and
Tahvonen (2004). These papers solve a similar di¤erential game between the producers
and the consumers cartels, in a framework where global warming creates damages to
consumers welfare. They study the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium (MPNE) of the
game, and compare it to some benchmarks.
Liski and Tahvonen (2004) consolidate, clarify, and extend the results obtained in
these papers. They show that the optimal design of the carbon tax in the presence of two-
sided strategic interactions generally deviates from a Pigouvian tax that internalizes only
the environmental damage. Moreover, considering linear strategies, they solve explicitly
the MPNE in the linear-quadratic case, and prove that when the damage is not too severe,
the carbon tax shifts more rents than what is necessary to internalize the environmental
externality whereas it is the contrary when the damage is large. They also study the time
prole of the carbon tax and the producer price. If the damage is small, the carbon tax is
decreasing with time and the producer price is increasing; if the damage is intermediate,
both are increasing; if the damage is large, the carbon tax is increasing and the producer
price decreasing. Finally, they conjecture that the sellers payo¤ is always  whatever
the damage is  lower and the buyers payo¤ higher in the MPNE than in the pre-tax
situation.
The aim of the present paper is to delve further into this question. We revisit the di¤er-
ential game between oil consuming and producing countries when the former shape their
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climate policy to take into account the existence of a physical upper limit on atmospheric
carbon concentration, which overtaking would lead to catastrophic consequences. The
level of this ceiling is based on scientic evidence. It has been set at 450 parts per million
carbon dioxide equivalent by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 2007, in
its Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC (2007)), target which would provide a reasonable
chance of averting warming beyond 2C above pre-industrial temperature. Following
the work of Allen et al. (2009) and Meinshausen et al. (2009), it has been recently ar-
gued that the correct way of thinking about global warming is in terms of a global CO2
emission budget, which overtaking would trigger temperature rises above 2C, because
of all the uncertainties in the carbon cycle, the climate response to an increase in the
atmospheric carbon concentration, and the natural decay. This global carbon budget is
exactly equivalent to a cap on carbon atmospheric concentration, provided that natural
carbon absorption by sinks is negligible. The precise level of the ceiling is of course depen-
dent on current scientic knowledge and likely to evolve. We shall nevertheless consider
it as xed. Finally, imposing a ceiling constraint beyond which damages become innite
does not mean that there exists no damage before the ceiling. Consistently with the
existence of the ceiling, we assume that these damages are relatively small. We then com-
bine in this paper a ceiling on atmospheric carbon concentration and a small damage
function before (and at) the ceiling.
This ceiling framework was introduced in the theoretical litterature on optimal fossil
resources extraction and global warming by Chakravorty, Magné and Moreaux (2006a),
(2006b). Its introduction in a di¤erential game raises a number of technical problems.
Whereas in general linear-quadratic specications make it possible to obtain explicitly a
solution of the game, the linear one, the ceiling constraint introduces here an intrinsic
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non-linearity in the problem and we cannot expect to obtain a linear solution. We are
nevertheless able to obtain a solution of the MPNE, which is non-linear .
We obtain implicit feedback rules and explicit time paths of extraction, carbon tax
and producer price. We show that the producer and consumer prices are monotonically
increasing in time, whereas the carbon tax may be rst decreasing and is always increasing
near the ceiling. As far as rent capture is concerned, we show that the carbon tax always
shifts more rent than necessary for an environmental motive, meaning that consumers are
able to reap some part of the scarcity and monopoly rents, and that producers are able
to preempt to some extent the carbon tax only if the marginal damage under the ceiling
is small.
We then compare the MPNE and three benchmarks. The comparison with the e¢cient
equilibrium allows us to assess to what extent the carbon tax of the MPNE departs from
the tax of the e¢cient equilibrium, designed to correct the environmental problem only.
The comparison with the open loop equilibrium highlights the impact of the producers
and consumers feedback strategies. The comparison with the cartel without carbon tax
equilibrium which, as argued by Liski and Tahvonen (2004) is the proper benchmark since
it is the pre-tax situation, allows us to see whether consumers gain in terms of welfare
when they adopt a common environmental policy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the assumptions of the model,
solves the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium and studies its properties. Section 3 studies
the three benchmarks against which the properties of the MPNE will be assessed. The
equilibria are compared in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
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II Markov-perfect Nash Equilibrium
We study the strategic interactions between a cartel of fossil fuel producers and a coalition
of consumers coordinating their carbon emission taxation to ght global warming, in a
di¤erential games framework of analysis. Whereas producers set the fossil fuel price,
consumers set the carbon tax in order to meet an atmospheric carbon concentration
constraint based on scientic knowledge and taken as given, and to internalize the damage
caused by the rise in temperature.
Consumers area
In the consumers area, the utility of the representative consumer is derived from the use
of the fossil resource. The utility function is denoted u (xt) ; where x is the consumed
resource ow (lets say oil). It is assumed to be quadratic and concave:
u (x) = ax 
b
2
x2; a > 0; b > 0: (1)
u0(0) = a is the choke price, for which demand becomes nil.
The initial resource stock is X0; the stock still in the ground at date t is Xt: The
additional (to the pre-industrial level) atmospheric carbon concentration at date t is Zt:
We assume that natural carbon absorption is nil, so that the additional atmospheric
carbon concentration at date t is strictly equal to the stock yet extracted and burnt at
this date: Zt = X0 Xt. This assumption has two justications: rstly, natural absorption
by sinks (oceans, forests) is uncertain and likely to decrease while carbon concentration
increases; secondly and more technically, it allows us to consider only one stock in the
problem and obtain tractable solutions.
Climate policy takes the form of a ceiling constraint: X0   Xt  Z where Z is the
ceiling on the additional carbon stock. Z is a physical constraint, and can be seen as the
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global carbon budget allowing humanity to contain the rise of temperature under 2C.
But this does not mean of course that the rise of temperature does not cause any damage
before the ceiling is reached. To be consistent with the choice of the value of the ceiling,
it can be assumed that these damages are small  otherwise the ceiling would have been
ill-chosen. We then introduce the damage that indeed appears before the ceiling, and,
following Amigues et al. (2011), we suppose this damage linear:
D(Xt) = d(X0  Xt); d > 0: (2)
The buyers regulator sets a unit carbon tax for the area to control the pollution
accumulation due to the resource use, taking into account the demand function of the
representative consumer, given by:
u0(x) = p+ ; (3)
where p is the producer price and  the carbon tax. The regulator maximizes on the
whole horizon the discounted net surplus, di¤erence between the consumers utility and
the amount paid to producers, subject to the law of carbon accumulation in the at-
mosphere and the ceiling constraint. Tax revenues are reimbursed as lump-sum transfers
to consumers, so they do not appear into the net surplus.
The two players act simultaneously, and the game is played with feedback (Markovian)
strategies. The buyers regulator, when choosing the carbon tax , takes into account the
fact that the producer price depends on the resource stock, that is p (X).
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The buyers regulator problem is4:
V mc (X0) = max
t
Z
1
0
e t [u (x (p (Xt) + t))  ptx (p (Xt) + t) D (Xt)] dt
s.t.

_Xt =  x (p (Xt) + t)
X0  Xt  Z
X0; Z given.
(4)
Let c be the shadow price of the resource and ! the Lagrange multiplier associated
to the ceiling constraint. First order optimality conditions and the complementarity
slackness condition read5:
t = ct (5)
_ct = ct + p
0(Xt)xt +D
0(Xt)  !t (6)
lim
t!1
e tctXt = 0 (7)
!t  0; Xt  X0 + Z  0; !t(Xt  X0 + Z) = 0: (8)
Let Tm be the date at which the ceiling becomes binding. Given the structure of the
problem, if the initial atmospheric carbon concentration is lower than the ceiling, which
4Superscript m for Markov. We will use in what follows the superscripts o for optimum/e¢cient
equilibrium, ol for open loop equilibrium and c for cartel without tax equilibrium.
5Conventionally, HamiltonJacobiBellman equations are used to solve the MPNE because they yield
directly strategies depending on the state variable, here X: We have prefered to use here the maximum
principle, because the value function is potentially non-di¤erentiable at the ceiling, and consequently
discontinuities of the feedback rule at the ceiling are possible. The use of the maximum principle allows
us to overcome this di¢culty. Notice that the non-di¤erentiability of the value function at the ceiling
is equivalent to the discontinuity of the stock shadow price at the ceiling. We study this potential
discontinuity in the on-line Appendix B and show that indeed it exists. We solve the same problem using
HamiltonJacobiBellman equations in the on-line Appendix E, to convince the reader that we actually
obtain the same strategies.
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we assume, the ceiling will not be binding before Tm (!t = 0 8t < Tm), and will remain
binding forever after Tm (!t > 0 8t  Tm). After the ceiling is reached, the resource
consumer price, sum of the producer price and the carbon tax, remains equal to u0(0);
the price at which demand is choked, and x = 0:
Before the ceiling i.e. 8t < Tm; equations (5) and (6) yield the following evolution of
the carbon tax:
_t = t + p
0(Xt)xt +D
0(Xt): (9)
(9) integrates into:
t =
 
e TmTm 

et  
Z Tm
t
e (s t)D0(Xs)ds 
Z Tm
t
e (s t)p0(Xs)xsds: (10)
The carbon tax is the sum of three terms.
The rst term on the right-hand side of equation (10) is what we may name the "pure
Hotellinian tax". It comes from the existence of the ceiling constraint and grows at the
discount rate. The second term represent the pure Pigouvian tax of Liski and Tahvonen
(2004). It is due to the existence of damages before the ceiling and is the usual discounted
sum of future marginal damages. Without ceiling and small damage, Tm would tend to
innity and both terms would be nil6. There would then exist no environmental motive
for taxation.
The third term on the right-hand side of (10) is the strategic component of the carbon
tax. It represents the pure import tari¤ of Liski and Tahvonen (2004) if p0(:) < 0;
and their pure import subsidy if p0(:) > 0. In the rst case, the carbon tax is positive
even absent any damage. Consumers tax oil more heavily than the environmental motive
would require, and are thus able to reap to some extent the scarcity and monopoly rents
6This comes from the transversality condition (7), since Xt would tend in the long run to a strictly
positive value because of assumption (15) on the extraction cost function.
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of producers. In the second case, consumers subsidize oil consumption to correct the
monopoly distorsion.
After the ceiling i.e. 8t  Tm; equations (5) and (6) yield the following evolution of
the carbon tax:
_t = t +D
0(Xt)  !t: (11)
Using the transversality condition (7), (11) integrates into:
t =
Z
1
t
e (t s)!sds 
Z
1
t
e (s t)D0(Xs)ds: (12)
Producers area
Producers face a unit extraction cost depending on the resource stock still in the ground.
The smaller this stock the higher the marginal extraction cost: the last drop of oil is
very costly to extract. More precisely, the unit extraction cost is c(Xt); with c(X) > 0;
c0(X) < 0: We use the following linear specication:
c (X) = c1   c2X; c1 > 0; c2 > 0: (13)
We make the assumption that initial extraction is protable:
c(X0) < u
0(0), X0 >
c1   a
c2
: (14)
With a constant marginal extraction cost, scarcity is purely physical. Here, scarcity
can be economic, in the sense that the marginal cost of extraction of the last drop of oil
can be higher than the choke price. Following Liski and Tahvonen (2004), we therefore
assume that economic scarcity is binding:
c(0) > u0(0), c1 > a: (15)
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Then the last drop will never be extracted; producers will stop extraction before and
leave some oil in the ground. Without any environmental constraint  neither ceiling nor
damage in our framework, they will leave in the ground a stock X1 dened by:
c(X1) = u
0(0), X1 =
c1   a
c2
: (16)
We assume that producers do not intend to adopt any climate policy, but are perfectly
aware that consumers do.
The sellers regulator, when choosing the producer price, maximizes on the whole
horizon its discounted prots, subject to the law of evolution of the resource stock:
V mp (X0) = max
pt
Z
1
0
e t (pt   c(Xt)) x (pt +  (Xt)) dt
s.t.

_Xt =  x (pt +  (Xt))
X0 given.
(17)
Producers are assumed to be aware of the reaction function of buyers to the state
variable, (X).
The rst order conditions give the producers price strategy and the evolution of the
shadow price of the resource p; together with the transversality condition:
pt = c(Xt) 
x (pt +  (Xt))
x0 (pt +  (Xt))
+ pt (18)
_pt = pt + (c
0(Xt) + 
0(Xt))x (pt +  (Xt)) (19)
lim
t!1
e tptXt = 0: (20)
In equation (18), c(X)   x (:) =x0 (:) is the static component of the monopoly price.
The scarcity rent must be added to this static component.
Integrating equation (19) forward before the ceiling (t < Tm) yields:
pt =
 
e TmpTm 

et  
Z Tm
t
e (s t)(c0(Xs) + 
0(Xs))xsds: (21)
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The scarcity rent exhibits a Hotelling component, and a second component expressing
the fact that a marginal amount of stock extracted at a given date s a¤ects future prots
by c0(Xs)+
0(Xs); because of increased extraction costs and the variation of the consumers
tax rate, which must be reected in the current price. While the extraction cost e¤ect
clearly reduces future prots and increases the scarcity rent and todays price, the tax
e¤ect is at this stage ambiguous.
With the specication (1) adopted for the utility function, the demand function is:
x(p+ ) =
a  (p+ )
b
; (22)
and (18) reads before the ceiling:
p =
1
2
[c(X) + a  (X) + p] : (23)
This formulation highlights the two e¤ects of the carbon tax on the producer price: a
negative static e¤ect through the monopoly price (when  increases, the cartel decreases
p to support demand, and vice versa), and a dynamic e¤ect through the scarcity rent. The
sign of this last e¤ect is at this stage indeterminate. If it is positive, it can be interpreted
as a preemptive behaviour of the cartel: when the cartel extracts one unit of oil it knows
that it will increase the atmospheric carbon concentration and that consequently the
consumers coalition will increase the carbon tax, and it reacts by increasing the producer
price.
Consider now what happens after the ceiling is reached. Integrating (19) forward after
Tm and using the transversality condition (20) shows that the scarcity rent is nil after
the ceiling, which makes sense since the resource wont be extracted anymore. Then (18)
yields pt = c(X0 Z) = p; t  Tm: Then, since pt+ t = u
0(0) t  Tm; t = u
0(0)  p = ;
t  Tm:
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Notice that nothing insures neither that the scarcity rent is continuous at the ceiling,
i.e. that pTm  = 0; nor that the producer price and the carbon tax are.
The non-linear solution
In general, the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibria of di¤erential games are studied under
the assumptions of quadratic objective functions (utility, prot) and linear cost functions.
Linear solutions are then the only ones that can be computed throughout analytically,
even if other solutions may exist. But here, the ceiling constraint introduces an intrinsic
non-linearity in the problem. Hence it is natural that the linear solution holds only if this
constraint is not binding, that is if the ceiling is su¢ciently high, so that the increase in
unit extraction cost triggers the stop of extraction for economic reasons before the ceiling
is reached. We make the opposite assumption that the ceiling is su¢ciently low, so that it
requires to stop extraction before the date at which it would have stopped spontaneously,
and to leave more fossil fuel in the ground. The study of the linear solution, valid under
the assumption of a high ceiling, is relegated to the on-line Appendix A.
The equilibrium of the game is characterized by equations (5) and (23) giving the
carbon tax and the producer price depending on the shadow price of the resource respec-
tively for consumers and producers, and equations (6) and (19) giving the evolution of
these shadow prices.
Considering the shadow prices c and p as functions of the resource stock, notice that
_c = 
0
c(X) _X =  
0
c(X)x; and that the same holds for
_p: Then the sum of equations (9)
giving the evolution of the carbon tax before the ceiling and (19) giving the evolution of
the scarcity rent yields, at the equilibrium:
 ((X) + p(X)) + (p
0(X) + c0(X) + 20(X) + 0p(X))x+D
0(X) = 0: (24)
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Di¤erentiating (23) w.r.t. X and replacing in (24) yields:


(X) + p(X) +
D0(X)


+
3
2
(c0(X) + 0(X) + 0p(X))x = 0: (25)
Wirl and Dockner (1995) suggests (in a somewhat di¤erent framework) to introduce a
proper sum of the relevant variables in order to help solving the problem. One possibility
here turns out to be:
 (X) = c(X) + (X) + p(X) +
D0(X)

: (26)
Equation (25) now reads:
 ((X)  c(X)) +
3
2
0(X)x = 0; (27)
while, from (23) and using the assumption of a constant marginal damage (2),
p(X) + (X) =
1
2

a+
d

+ (X)

(28)
which can also be written:
a  bx =
1
2

a+
d

+ (X)

: (29)
By elimination of x; (27) and (29) yield a non-linear di¤erential equation in X:
0 (X) =
4b
3
0
@ (X)  c (X)
(X) 

a  d


1
A : (30)
We assume that a > d= which means that at date 0 the choke price is higher than
the discounted value of the marginal damage or, to put it di¤erently, that the marginal
damage before the ceiling is small.
We show in the on-line Appendix A that a linear solution to this equation exists, but
that it is valid only in the case where the ceiling constraint is not binding. We want to
nd a solution in the case of a su¢ciently stringent ceiling, in the sense that the oil stock
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that is left in the ground with the ceiling constraint is larger than the one that would be
left without it (but taking into account the existence of the damage):
X0   Z >
c1  

a  d


c2
= eX: (31)
This solution has to be non-linear. Moreover, it is unique. Indeed, as shown by Tsutsui
and Mino (1990), Dockner and Long (1993), Rowat (2007) and Wirl (2007), when the
ceiling is not binding, (uncountably many) non-linear strategies coexist with the linear
strategy. They all admit as a steady state an atmospheric carbon concentration lower
than the one reached asymptotically by the Markov linear strategy, which amounts to
say that the oil stock ultimately left in the ground is higher than eX. These non-linear
strategies are Pareto-inferior to the linear one (Wirl and Dockner (1995)). But in our game
the boundary condition (the ceiling) allows us to pin down the unique solution, among
the non-linear ones, which admits as a steady state an atmospheric carbon concentration
equal to Z: The boundary condition rules multiple equilibria out.
It is not possible to nd (X) analytically, so we resort to a phase diagram (Figure
1).
< Figure 1 about here >
On the phase diagram, 0(X) = 0 , (X) = c(X); the admissible zone is under
the line (X) = a   d=, since p +  = (a+ d=+ (X)) =2 < a ) (X) < a   d=;
0(X) < 0 when (X) > c(X); and 0(X) > 0 when (X) < c(X); nally, 0(X) !
 1, (X) = a  d=: Starting from (X0) > c(X0); the unique stable arm is travelled
along from the right to the left, towards the equilibrium (X0 Z) = a d=: X decreases,
and as 0(X) < 0; (X) increases.
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We can now express the feedback rules for extraction, the scarcity rent, the carbon
tax and the producer price. Equation (29) is equivalent to
x =
1
2b

a 
d

  (X)

: (32)
From (19),
p(X) + 
0(X)x = 0: (33)
i.e., with (32) and (30),
p(X) =
1
2b

(X)  a+
d


0(X) =
2
3
[(X)  c (X)] : (34)
From (25), using (32), (34) and (30),
(X) =
1
3
[(X)  c (X)] +
d

: (35)
Finally, from (28), using (35),
p(X) =
1
6
(X) +
1
3
c(X) +
1
2

a 
d


: (36)
Notice that absent any damage before the ceiling (d = 0), the carbon tax is equal to
half the scarcity rent ((X) = p(X)=2 8X): This implies that the dynamic strategic
e¤ect of the carbon tax on the producer price is stronger than the static monopoly e¤ect
(see equation (23)), and that consequently the producers cartel is able to preempt to
some extent the carbon tax, as explained by Wirl (1995). This is not true anymore with
damage: we now have (X) = p(X)=2 + d=; and preemption is all the less likely since
d is large. On the phase diagram, the carbon tax can be read as d= plus one third of the
vertical distance between the curve (X) and the line 0(X) = 0 (see equation (35)).
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At the ceiling, x is nil, X is equal to X0   Z; and we have shown that, 8t  Tm :
pt = p = c
 
X0   Z

(37)
t =  = a  c
 
X0   Z

(38)
!t = ! =    d: (39)
The producer price at the ceiling is equal to the unit extraction cost. The level of the
carbon tax is then such that demand is totally choked, since the consumer price is equal
to the choke price a. The scarcity rent is nil.
Proposition 1 MPNE
(i) Before the ceiling, the consumer and producer prices are monotonically increasing;
the carbon tax may be rst decreasing and then increasing, and is always increasing near
the ceiling. The carbon tax includes an import tari¤ element.
(ii) The carbon tax and the producer price are not continuous at the ceiling, whereas
the consumer price is. When reaching the ceiling, the carbon tax jumps upwards and the
producer price jumps downwards to the marginal extraction cost.
Proof. Equation (28) shows that the consumer price is monotonically increasing in time,
since 0(X) < 0 and X is monotonically decreasing in time. Moreover, (28) and (37)(38)
show that the consumer price is continuous at the juncture, and equal to the choke price
u0(0) = a.
Equation (35) yields 0(X) = (0(X)  c0 (X)) =3: As 0(X) < 0 and c0 (X) < 0; the
sign of 0(X) is indeterminate. However, limX!X0 Z 
0(X) =  1; and, by continuity,
0(X) < 0 and the carbon tax is increasing in time near the ceiling.
Equation (36) yields p0(X) = 0(X)=6+c0(X)=3 < 0: Hence the producer price is increas-
ing with time.
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This proves part (i) of the proposition.
When X ! X0   Z; (35) and (36) show that (X)!

(a  d=)  c
 
X0   Z

=3 + d=
and p(X)!

2 (a  d=) + c
 
X0   Z

=3: However at the ceiling, according to (38) and
(37), t =  = a   c
 
X0   Z

and pt = p = c
 
X0   Z

: This proves part (ii) of the
proposition.
The important result lies in the rst part of the Proposition. It concerns the time
prole of the carbon tax and the producer price. Whereas the price increases along the
whole trajectory, the carbon tax may be rst decreasing, but always ends up increasing.
Moreover, the carbon tax always includes an import tari¤, allowing consuming countries
to reap a part of the oil and monopoly rents. This result challenges the robustness of Liski
and Tahvonen (2004) ndings, namely that the carbon tax includes an import tari¤ when
the damage is not too severe, whereas it includes an import subsidy when the damage is
large.
Though the feedback rules cannot be expressed as closed-form functions of X; it is
possible to obtain the time paths of extraction, carbon tax and producer price implied by
the MPNE.
Di¤erentiating (32) w.r.t. time and using (30) yields:
_x =  
2
3
0
@ (X)  c (X)
(X) 

a  d


1
A _X: (40)
Notice that _x =   X and that, from (32), (X)   (a  d=) =  2bx = 2b _X: Equation
(40) then reads:
X =

3b
((X)  c (X)) =

3b

2b _X + a 
d

  c (X)

:
Replacing c(X) by its linear specication (13), we obtain a second order di¤erential equa-
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tion in X :
3b X   2b _X   c2X + 

c1  

a 
d


= 0: (41)
The solution of this di¤erential equation is:
Xt = 1e
v1t + 2e
v2t +
c1  

a  d


c2
; (42)
with:
v1 =

3

1 +
r
1 +
3c2
b

> 0 and v2 =

3

1 
r
1 +
3c2
b

< 0: (43)
If the ceiling constraint never binds, that is if X0   Z  eX; the v1 root can be ruled
out as Xt can neither become negative (if 1 < 0) nor increase (if 1 > 0). In such a case,
the solution is the linear one, where X converges asymptotically to eX. We have excluded
this case. Under the opposite assumption, the two roots must be conserved and we obtain
the non-linear solution.
Three equations are needed to determine implicitly the three unknown 1; 2; and
Tm: the initial condition X0, the condition at the ceiling XTm = X0 Z; and the fact that
extraction becomes nil at the ceiling7, xTm = 0: These conditions read:
X0 = 1 + 2 +
c1  

a  d


c2
(44)
X0   Z = 1e
v1Tm + 2e
v2Tm +
c1  

a  d


c2
(45)
0 = v11e
v1Tm + v22e
v2Tm : (46)
Equations (45) and (46) yield:
1 =  
v2
v1   v2

X0   Z   eX e v1Tm > 0 (47)
2 =
v1
v1   v2

X0   Z   eX e v2Tm > 0: (48)
7The proof is relegated to the on-line Appendix B.
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Then (44) yields
v1e
 v2Tm   v2e
 v1Tm
v1   v2
=
X0   eX
X0   Z   eX ; (49)
which gives Tm implicitly. It is an increasing function of Z: It is also an increasing function
of d. The existence of a small damage puts forward the juncture date: indeed, because of
this damage, at each date oil consumption is lowered and the ceiling is reached later.
We can now obtain the time paths of the extraction, consumer price (from (3)), scarcity
rent (from (33) and (40)), carbon tax and producer price:
xt =   _Xt =  v11e
v1t   v22e
v2t (50)
pt + t = a  bxt = a+ b(v11e
v1t + v22e
v2t) (51)
pt =  
2b

_xt =
2b

 
v211e
v1t + v222e
v2t

(52)
t =
1
2
pt +
d

=
b

 
v211e
v1t + v222e
v2t

+
d

(53)
pt = a 
d

+
b


v11 (  v1) e
v1t + v22 (  v2) e
v2t

: (54)
III Benchmarks
Three possible benchmarks are studied, against which the properties of the MPNE will be
assessed: the e¢cient equilibrium, the open loop equilibrium of the game, and the cartel
without carbon tax equilibrium. The rst one allows us to assess whether the monopoly
power of the producers cartel and the strategic behaviour of the two players lead to too
much or too little extraction, compared to what is optimal. The second one allows us
to assess the e¤ect of the feedback strategies on the producer price and the carbon tax.
The last one is the proper benchmark, as argued by Liski and Tahvonen (2004), since
it is the pre-tax situation. The comparison of the pre-tax and the MPNE outcomes for
consumers shows whether consumers benet in terms of welfare from the implementation
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of the carbon tax.
Optimum and e¢cient equilibrium
The world central planners problem reads8:
V  (X0) = max
xt
Z
1
0
e t [u (xt)  c(Xt)xt  D (Xt)] dt
s.t.

_Xt =  xt
X0  Xt  Z
X0 given.
(55)
Denoting by t the shadow price of the resource stock and !t the Lagrange multiplier
associated to the ceiling constraint, rst order optimality conditions and the complemen-
tarity slackness condition are:
u0 (xt) = c(Xt) + t (56)
_t = t + c
0(Xt)xt +D
0(Xt)  !t (57)
lim
t!1
e ttXt = 0 (58)
!t  0; Xt  X0 + Z  0; !t(Xt  X0 + Z) = 0: (59)
Before the ceiling, the marginal utility on the optimal path is the sum of the marginal
extraction cost and of a rent t, encompassing the scarcity rent and the carbon shadow
value, in this simplied framework where the same stock characterizes the fossil resource
stock in the ground and the atmospheric carbon concentration.
It is possible to show that extraction x is continuous at the juncture, in the same line
as for the MPNE. Then, from (56), the costate  is also continuous at the juncture.
8Notice that it is exactly equivalent to the problem without ceiling but with an initial resource stock
X0   Z:
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Di¤erentiating (56) w.r.t. time and using (57) yields:
u00(x) _x = c0(X) _X + ( + c0(X)x+D0(X)  !) =  +D0(X)  !:
Before the ceiling, ! = 0 and we get, using (56) again, the optimal extraction path:
u00 (x) _x =  (u0 (x)  c(X)) +D0(X): (60)
With the specications adopted for the utility, damage and extraction cost functions,
(60) reads:
b X   b _X   c2X + 

c1  

a 
d


= 0; (61)
a linear di¤erential equation of the second order, as in the MPNE, but with di¤erent
coe¢cients.
The solution is:
Xt = 1e
u1t + 2e
u2t + c1  

a 
d


; (62)
with
u1 =

2

1 +
r
1 +
4c2
b

> 0 and u2 =

2

1 
r
1 +
4c2
b

< 0: (63)
As in the case of the MPNE, three boundary conditions allow us to obtain the unknown
1; 2 and To : the initial condition X0, the condition at the ceiling XTo = X0   Z; and
the fact that extraction becomes nil at the ceiling, xTo = 0: With the same argument as
in the MPNE, it is possible to show that 1; 2 > 0:
At date To; the ceiling is reached, and we have, 8t  To:8>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>:
Xt = X0   Z
xt = 0
t = u
0(0)  c(X0   Z)
!t = t   d:
(64)
23
The decentralization of the optimum leads to an e¢cient competitive equilibrium, pro-
vided that the right environmental tax redistributed by lump-sum transfers to consumers
is implemented in the consumers area.
The demand function of the representative consumer is given by u0 (x) = p+ :
On the producer side:
V op (X0) = max
xt
Z
1
0
e t [pt   c (Xt)]xtdt (65)
s.t. _Xt =  xt; X0 given.
Denoting by p the scarcity rent, the rst order conditions read:
pt = c(Xt) + pt (66)
_pt = pt + c
0(Xt)xt (67)
lim
t!1
e tptXt = 0: (68)
The equilibrium is then dened by:
u0 (xt) = c(Xt) + pt + t: (69)
Di¤erentiating equation (69) w.r.t. time and using (67) yields:
b X   b _X   c2X + (c1   a) = _   : (70)
Comparing (61) and (70) shows that for the equilibrium to be an optimum the carbon
tax before the ceiling must be such that _t   t =  d; which integrates into
t =
 
Toe
 To

et +
d

 
1  e (To t)

; 8t  0: (71)
The optimal carbon tax is the sum of the Hotellinian tax and the pure Pigouvian tax.
Extraction x and the marginal extraction cost c0(X) being continuous at the ceiling,
(67) implies that _p   p is continuous, and yields, integrating forward and using the
24
transversality condition (68)9,
pt =  
Z
1
t
e (s t)c0(Xs)xsds; 8t  0: (72)
Then, as xs = 0; s  To; pTo = 0: The scarcity rent is continuous at the juncture, and
equal to 0. Then the carbon tax is also continuous, and it is equal to  given by (38).
This allows us to obtain the initial level of the carbon tax: 0 = e
 To +d=
 
1  e To

:
Moreover, it is straightforward to show that the carbon tax is monotonically increasing
i¤  > d= which, according to the denition (38) of ; is true when the ceiling is binding.
Equations (66) and (67) show that the producer price is monotonically increasing
before the ceiling. Moreover, by (66), the producer price is continuous at the juncture
and equal to p given by (37).
These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 E¢cient equilibrium
(i) Before the ceiling, the carbon tax is the sum of a pure Hotellinian tax and a pure
Pigouvian tax, monotonically increasing, and the producer price is also monotonically
increasing.
(ii) The carbon tax and the producer price are continuous at the ceiling.
Open loop equilibrium
In this case, the players base their strategies on time alone.
The consumers regulator problem is similar to problem (4), but for the fact that he
takes the producer price as given. Equally, the producers regulator problem is similar to
(17), but for the fact that he takes the carbon tax as given.
9Notice that the same reasoning cannot be made in the case of the MPNE, since we are not sure that

0(X) is continuous.
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The rst order optimality conditions are, on the consumers side:
t = ct (73)
_ct = ct +D
0(Xt)  !t (74)
lim
t!1
e tctXt = 0; (75)
which shows that before the ceiling the carbon tax is the sum of the Hotellinian tax and
the Pigouvian tax.
On the producer side, the rst order optimality conditions read:
pt =
1
2
[c(Xt) + a+ pt   t] (76)
_pt = pt + c
0(Xt)xt (77)
lim
t!1
e tptXt = 0: (78)
The equilibrium before the ceiling is characterized by:
u0(x) = p+  () a  bx =
1
2
[c(X) + a+  + p] : (79)
Di¤erentiating (79) w.r.t. time and using (74) and (77) yields:
2b X   2b _X   c2X + 

c1  

a 
d


= 0; (80)
again a linear di¤erential equation of the second order, but with di¤erent coe¢cients.
The solution has the same form as in the MPNE and the e¢cient equilibrium:
Xt = 1e
w1t + 2e
w2t +
c1  

a  d


c2
; (81)
with
w1 =

2

1 +
r
1 +
2c2
b

> 0 and w2 =

2

1 
r
1 +
2c2
b

< 0: (82)
As in the cases of the MPNE and the e¢cient equilibrium, three boundary conditions
allow us to obtain the unknown 1; 2 and Tol; the date at which the ceiling is reached:
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the initial condition X0, the condition at the ceiling XTol = X0   Z; and the fact that
extraction becomes nil at the ceiling, xTol = 0: It is possible to show that 1; 2 > 0:
Proposition 3 Open loop equilibrium
(i) Before the ceiling, the carbon tax is the sum of a Hotellinian tax and a Pigouvian
tax and is always increasing, whereas the producer price may be rst increasing and then
decreasing, and is decreasing when approaching the ceiling.
(ii) The carbon tax and the producer price are continuous at the ceiling.
Proof. To prove part (ii), remark that p is continuous at the juncture by the same
argument as in the e¢cient equilibrium case. Its continuity implies that of the carbon
tax (from (79)) and the producer price.
To prove part (i) note rst that the consumer price is increasing as p+  = a+ b _X )
d(p + )=dt = b X > 0: As far as the carbon tax before the ceiling is concerned, (73)
and (74) show that it has the same expression than in the e¢cient equilibrium (equation
(71)), hence has the same properties. Finally, the sign of _p is indeterminate. However at
the juncture at date Tol; using (76) and (77), _pTol  =  
_Tol =2 < 0: This proves part (i)
of the proposition.
The discontinuity of the carbon tax and the producer price at the juncture at the
MPNE is then the consequence of the feedback strategies of the players, since this dis-
continuity does not exist at the open loop equilibrium.
Cartel equilibrium without carbon tax
This equilibrium can be seen as the present situation, where everybody is aware of the
existence of the physical limit Z to atmospheric carbon concentration but ignores it.
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The buyers demand for oil is simply given by u0(x) = p: The sellers regulator solves
the same problem as in the open loop game, but for the fact that now the carbon tax
is nil. The equilibrium is characterized by equation (80), as in the open loop game; but
now producers behave as if no constraint could prevent them from extracting all what
is economically protable. They intend to leave asymptotically X1 in the ground, and
choose the extraction path accordingly. In the solution of the linear di¤erential equation
(80), the positive exponential has to be ruled out. Therefore the time path of oil stock
and extraction are:
Xt = (X0  X1) e
w2t +X1 (83)
xt =  w2 (Xt  X1) (84)
with w2 given in (82).
But ignoring the ceiling does not make it disappear. Once the ceiling is reached,
the damage from consuming more oil becomes innite whereas the marginal utility of
consumption remains nite, and therefore consuming countries are not willing to buy oil
any more, even under a zero tax. Extraction drops to zero in nite time (at date Tc),
while a stock of oil XTc = X0   Z is left forever in the ground. From (83) we get:
Tc =
1
w2
ln
X0   Z  X1
X0  X1
: (85)
Finally, the producer price is given by:
pt = a+ bw2 (X0  X1) e
w2t; t  Tc; (86)
from which we deduce pTc = a+ bw2
 
X0   Z  X1

< a:
These results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Cartel without tax equilibrium
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Producers and consumers behave as if the ceiling did not exist. The resource price is
an increasing and concave function of time. It is lower than the choke price at the ceiling,
where it jumps upwards to the choke price while extraction jumps downwards to zero.
IV Comparison of equilibria
The comparison of the MPNE and the e¢cient equilibrium allows us to assess to what
extent the carbon tax of the MPNE departs from the Pigouvian tax of the e¢cient equi-
librium, designed to correct the environmental problem only, and to see if the game is
more or less conservative than what is optimal. The comparison of the MPNE and the
open loop equilibrium highlights the impact of the producers and consumers feedback
strategies. Finally, the comparison of the MPNE and the cartel without carbon tax equi-
librium allows us to see whether consumers gain in terms of welfare when they adopt a
common environmental policy.
Technically, the comparison is made easier by the fact that all equilibria reach in nite
time the same state, where a stock of oil X0 Z is left in the ground, atmospheric carbon
concentration is at the ceiling and oil consumption is nil. What changes in the di¤erent
equilibria is the intertemporal allocation of extraction, driven by di¤erent producer prices
and carbon taxes, and thus producers and consumers payo¤s.
Proposition 5 (i) The MPNE is more conservative than the open loop equilibrium, in
the sense that initial extraction is lower. Both are excessively conservative, compared to
what is e¢cient, and are also more conservative than the cartel without tax equilibrium.
The ceiling is reached later in the MPNE than in the open loop equilibrium, and later in
the open loop equilibrium than in the e¢cient equilibrium and than in the cartel without
tax equilibrium. The cartel without tax equilibrium is less conservative than the e¢cient
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equilibrium and the ceiling is reached sooner if it is low; it is the contrary if the ceiling is
high.
(ii) The ranking of the payo¤s for the producers and the consumers area respectively
are: V olp (X0) > V
m
p (X0) > V
o
p (X0) = 0 and V
o
c (X0) > V
ol
c (X0) > V
m
c (X0): When the
marginal damage is small enough, the consumers area gets a higher payo¤ in the MPNE
than in the cartel without tax case if the ceiling is high; it is the contrary if it is low.
Proof. (i) We prove in the on-line Appendix C that Tm > Tol > To ; Tol > Tc, and that
xo0 > x
ol
0 > x
m
0 ; x
c
0 > x
ol
0 : Notice that we cannot deduce the ranking of initial extractions
from the ranking of the dates at which the ceiling is reached and the fact that total
extraction is the same in the three equilibria, because in some of the equilibria extraction
can be convex-concave. It may be the case for instance in the MPNE since t can be rst
decreasing and then increasing and xt =  =b: _t.
The comparison of Tc and To on the one hand, x
c
0 and x
o
0 on the other hand is also relegated
to the on-line Appendix C.
(ii) The ranking of payo¤s is deduced from the ranking of initial extractions (except for
the producers payo¤ at the e¢cient equilibrium and both payo¤s at the cartel without tax
equilibrium), since V mp (X0) =
b

(xm0 )
2 ; V olp (X0) = b=:
 
xol0
2
; V oc (X0) = b=(2): (x
o
0)
2 ;
V mc (X0) = b=(2): (x
m
0 )
2 ; V olc (X0) = b=(2):
 
xol0
2
; see the on-line Appendix E. The
producers payo¤ at the e¢cient equilibrium is nil.
For the cartel without tax equilibrium the HamiltonJacobiBellman equation cannot be
used since consumers do not take into account the evolution of the stock in their problem
(the damage is an externality). The consumers payo¤ must be computed directly. We
get
V cc (X0) =
b
2
Z
1
0
e tx2tdt  d
Z
1
0
e t(X0  Xt)dt; (87)
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xt and Xt being given by (83) and (84). We compare in the on-line Appendix D the
consumers payo¤s V mc (X0) and V
c
c (X0) in the case d = 0 and prove the result stated
in the Proposition. This result can be extended by continuity to d small. As V mc (X0)
and V cc (X0) both are decreasing functions of d; it is not possible to obtain analytically a
ranking of the payo¤s for any value of d:
This Proposition contains at least three strong results.
First of all, when the two players act strategically, the sellers win. They get a higher
payo¤ than at the e¢cient equilibrium, whereas the buyers payo¤ is reduced.
Secondly, consumers and producers are both better o¤ in the open loop equilibrium
than in the MPNE. In this sense, playing feedback strategies is a lose-lose situation, both
parties ending up being worse o¤. There exists in this game a commitment value.
Lastly, when the ceiling is not too stringent and the marginal damage small enough,
consumers gain in the MPNE with respect to the pre-tax case. To put it di¤erently,
consumers are better o¤ with the carbon tax than without it if the global warming problem
is not too severe. In this case indeed, they do not su¤er from a too drastic reduction of
their oil consumption whereas they benet from the reduction of damages. Conversely,
consumers may lose, and we are sure that this is the case if the marginal damage is small
enough and the ceiling very stringent.
V Conclusion
Studying the MPNE of a game between two coalitions of oil producing and oil consuming
countries, Liski and Tahvonen (2004) show, within the damage function approach, that
the carbon tax is not purely Pigouvian. If the damage is not too severe, it includes an
import tari¤ element and exceeds the present value of marginal damages, allowing oil
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consuming countries to reap resource rents from the cartel of oil producers, whereas for
a serious damage this element is an import subsidy and the strategic tax falls short of
the Pigouvian one. The optimal design of the strategic tax (import subsidy or import
tari¤, tax increasing or decreasing in time) depends on the value of the parameter of the
quadratic damage function, featuring the severity of the damage. This severity also deter-
mines the temporal prole of the strategic producer price: increasing when the damage is
not too severe, decreasing otherwise. In terms of payo¤s, Liski and Tahvonen conjecture
that the strategic tax reduces the producers payo¤ and enhances the consumers payo¤,
compared to the pre-tax case, whatever the severity of the damage.
We revisit this game within the ceiling approach. We obtain a monotonically increasing
strategic producer price before the ceiling, and a carbon tax which may be decreasing or
increasing at the beginning of the planning horizon, but is always increasing near the
ceiling, and this independently on the stringency of the ceiling and the severity of the
small linear damage before the ceiling. Moreover, in this framework, the strategic tax
includes an import tari¤ element whatever the stringency of the ceiling. These results
challenge the robustness of the conclusions of the existing literature.
Compared to the open loop solution, behaving strategically is a lose-lose situation,
both parties ending up being worse o¤. Compared to the pre-tax situation (the cartel
without tax equilibrium), we prove that when the ceiling is tight and the small marginal
damage small enough the consumers are worse o¤ in the MPNE, whereas when the ceiling
is relatively high they are better o¤. We do not conrm here the conjecture of Liski and
Tahvonen (2004), which is that consumers always gain from introducing the carbon tax.
The practical discussions about the introduction of a carbon tax very often concentrate
on the distributive consequences of the tax within each country and between countries
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adopting the environmental policy and countries refusing to do so, without considering a
central actor in the climate change game, namely fossil fuel producers. We have in this
paper contributed to ll this gap, in a two-zones framework. But a lot remains to be
done.
Some very recent papers open new directions of research in this area. For instance
Fujiwara and Long (2010) consider a game with Stackelberg leadership, where the leader
can be the oil producing area or the oil consuming area, and wonder whether being the
Stackelberg leader is better than being the follower or not. Compared to Rubio and
Escriche (2001) they study two varieties of Stackelberg leadership, the global and the
stagewise ones, but do not introduce the climate motive for oil taxation. Another path is
opened by Wei et al. (2010), which consider that oil producing countries also consume oil,
and can counteract climate policy by using a strategy of price discrimination, subsidizing
the oil they consume. They only study the open loop equilibrium of the game.
In the same spirit, it would be very useful to distinguish between two di¤erent zones
of oil consuming countries, a Kyoto zone, setting a common carbon tax, and a non-
Kyoto zone refusing to do so. In this three players game, the oil cartels power should be
enhanced, but the consequences of the unilateral climate policy on Kyoto and non-Kyoto
countries is not trivial and deserves further research.
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